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Chronology 
 
The Danish debate on corporate governance was sparked off by developments in 
both the national and the international contexts. In the early 1990s, bankruptcies in a 
few major Danish companies were accompanied by discussions of the tasks and 
responsibilities of the company board, and in the latter part of the 1990s, 
liberalisation of capital markets and increased competition for capital prompted the 
government to establish an interministerial committee whose task it was to begin to 
analyse corporate governance in the Danish context. The committee concluded, 
among other things, that the provisions determining board composition (mainly owner 
representatives) and management functioned relatively well. However, some 
necessary changes were also identified. 
 
The process continued when in March 2001 the government asked four top company 
directors to consider whether there was a need for guidelines or recommendations 
for good corporate governace in Denmark. The committee came to be known as the 
“Nørby-udvalg”, after its chairman, Lars Nørby Johansen (Falck-Securicor). The other 
members were Jørgen Lindegaard (SAS), Waldemar Schmidt (ISS) and Mads 
Øvlisen (Novo Nordisk). 
 
The committee’s report (Nørby-udvalgets rapport on corporate governance i 
Danmark, available at www.corporategovernance.dk) was published in December 
2001. This report is still the main document of the Danish discussion, although it has 
been followed up by two other reports from another committee, also chaired by Lars 
Nørby Johansen. This committee was established by the Copenhagen Stock 
Exchange in November 2002, and its reports were published in January 2004 and 
May 2005 respectively. 
 
As we shall see, the Danish reports and the public debate on corporate governance 
have only marginally touched upon the issue of worker participation at board level 
(although according to Danish company legislation employees are entitled to fill one 
third of the seats on company boards). 
 
 
 
Corporate governance in the Danish context 
 
The 2001 report characterises the Danish system of corporate governance as 
something of a hybrid  between the one-tier and the two-tier systems. On the one 
hand, it is not strictly a one-tier system because there is a distinction between the 
board (bestyrelsen) and the top management (direktionen). On the other hand, the 
two bodies are not clearly separated, as in the German system. In Denmark, the 
board not only oversees the management, but also takes part in strategic 
management. Furthermore, Danish company law does not prevent top managers 
from being board members. Put differently, the board may consist of executive as 
well as non-executive directors (but is usually dominated by the latter). The 
committee’s view on these basic features of the Danish system was expressed quite 
clearly: 
 
The committee does not find reasons to presume that other governance models 
are superior to the Danish model. With its recommendations the committee 
would like to facilitate the even better functioning of the Danish model. (p. 25) 
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Regarding the paradigmatic distinction between shareholder and stakeholder models 
the report takes a middle-of-the-road position. However, the stakeholder perspective 
is supported only in a rather vague and non-committal way: 
 
The company’s management must … work for a long-term creation of wealth in 
the interests of the company and the shareholders. However, … the optimal 
representation of shareholder interests presupposes that other stakeholders 
are taken into consideration to a relevant extent. A company that exclusively 
attempts to represent the interests of the shareholders in the short term may 
destroy the possibility of creating shareholder value in the longer term by not 
taking into due consideration the company’s other stakeholders whose 
acceptance of the activities of the company may be a decisive prerequisite for 
continuing development. However, the many diverse stakeholders make it 
impossible to state precisely what kind of consideration individual companies 
should take in relation to stakeholders. (pp. 37–38) 
 
None of the three reports found reasons for proposing changes to Danish legislation. 
Instead, the reports formulated a set of recommendations. Above these, a meta-
recommendation is that companies in their reporting should either demonstrate that 
they are following these recommendations, or explain why they are not doing so. 
 
 
 
Recommendations to Danish companies 
 
An important component of both the 2001 and the 2005 reports was a list of 
recommendations to companies. The recommendations refer to eight areas: 
 
1. The role of shareholders and their interaction with the board. 
2. The role of stakeholders and their significance for the company. 
3. Openness and transparency. 
4. Tasks and responsibilities of the board. 
5. The composition of the board. 
6. Remuneration of board and management. 
7. Risk management. 
8. Auditing (not covered by the 2001 report). 
 
Most recommendations are identical from 2001 to 2005. They concern issues such 
as good information and communication practices, relations between the board and 
the management, relations with shareholders and stakeholders, procedures for 
regular evaluations of practice, and so on. Generally, the recommendations in the 
2005 report are less detailed and specific, and therefore one might say also less 
ambitious. One example of this can be found in the first of two recommendations 
regarding relations with stakeholders. In the 2001 report the formulation runs: 
 
It is recommended that the board formulates a policy for the company’s 
relations to its stakeholders, including for example the company’s basic idea, 
values and goals. One element in such a policy may be guidelines for the 
company’s dissemination of information on, for example, environmental and 
social issues. (p. 15) 
 
In the 2005 report only the first part of the first sentence is kept. Another example is 
that while the 2001 report recommends that the board be composed of no more than 
six persons elected by the general assembly (plus possible employee 
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representatives, but these are not mentioned), the 2005 report states only that the 
board should “not be so big as to prevent a constructive debate and an efficient 
decision-making process to take place”. 
 
In two respects, however, the 2005 report contains recommendations which were not 
included in 2001. First, it has a number of recommendations concerning auditing. 
Secondly, it explicitly mentions employee representation on the board. This is not 
done in the section on stakeholders, however, but in the section on board 
composition. Here, 
 
it is recommended that the individual company considers the need to explain 
the system of employee-elected board members in the annual report or on the 
company website. 
 
What lies behind this is the fear that in particular investors from outside continental 
Europe may view employee board representatives as something negative, and that 
therefore Danish companies – if they are wise – should explain how this institution 
functions. This apologetic approach has been criticised by Danish trade union 
leaders (see the daily newspaper Politiken, 1 April 2004) and by researchers (Caspar 
Rose in Tidsskrift for Arbejdsliv, vol. 7, no. 3, 2005) as a very defensive way of 
presenting the fact that employee representation is a well-established and well-
functioning element of corporate governance in Denmark. Instead, they argue, 
companies should present it as an asset that may help companies to make better 
decisions. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Inspired by the international discussion on corporate governance, as witnessed by 
reports from the USA, the UK, the OECD and the World Bank in the 1990s, the 
Danish reports and discussions have attempted to formulate recommendations for 
“best practice” in the Danish context. It is remarkable that employee representation 
on the board – which has been a feature of the Danish system since 1973 – has 
hardly played any role in the discussion. 
 
Perhaps the absence of this theme can be understood as the result of a kind of 
cross-pressure on those (relatively progressive and broad-minded business leaders) 
who have stood for the Danish contributions. On the one hand, they have had to 
recognise the neo-liberal context in which the corporate governance debate is taking 
place. On the other hand, there is no indication that employee representation at 
board level has affected companies negatively: rather the opposite. However, for 
them to speak positively of employee representation would be to openly contradict 
the neo-liberal paradigm. So why not just remain silent about employee 
representation! 
 
This is, of course, irritating, as it means that an opportunity for reflecting on and 
improving the role of employee participation has been missed. Conversely, at least it 
can be said that the discussion on corporate governance in Denmark has not 
degenerated into an attack on the principle of employee representation on company 
boards. 
 
(NB All quotations translated by the author.) 
 
